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FREE SPEECH VS. FREE PRESS:
ANALYZING THE IMPACT OF NELSON V.
McCLATCHYNEWSPAPERS, INC. ON THE
RIGHTS OF BROADCAST JOURNALISTS
I. INTRODUCTION
Freedom of individual political expression is among the most
personal of individual liberties for Americans. Yet many individuals
have jobs or careers consuming so much of their lives that they do
not have time to exercise this liberty. These individuals voluntarily
choose their careers over political involvement, even though they
have the option to engage in both simultaneously if they desire.
Journalists in America do not have this luxury. They are politically
neutralized by corporate policies and journalism codes of ethics from
the time they decide to pursue journalism as a career.' For the most
part, this type of political abstinence is enforced only upon print
journalists and not broadcast journalists.2 The current trend, how-
ever, is to extend policies constraining political activity to cover
broadcast journalists as well.3
1. See Karen Schneider & Marc Gunther, Those Newsroom Ethics Codes,
COLUM. JOURNALIsM REv., July-Aug. 1985, at 55, 55.
2. Other careers also exist which limit individuals in their outside political
activities. Government employees are restricted by the Hatch Act from
"tak[ing] an active part in political management or political campaigns." 5
U.S.C. § 7323(b) (1988). Yet restrictions on journalists often sweep far more
widely than provisions of the Hatch Act because the Hatch Act at least pre-
serves the right of a government employee to "express his opinion on political
subjects and candidates." Id. § 7323(c). The Hatch Act also does not reach
many types of outside activity that journalists are restricted from engaging in,
such as demonstrations and community involvement. See id. § 7323.
3. See, e.g., Talk of the Nation: Journalism and Ethics and Television
(National Public Radio News, June 9, 1997) [hereinafter Talk Nation] (quoting
Barbara Cochran stating that CBS News has conflict rules that govern its em-
ployees and prohibit them from "tak[ing] part in any kind of political or parti-
san activity."); Verne Gay, Crossing the Line, NEWSDAY, July 1, 1997, at B4
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It is unthinkable that the Framers of the United States Constitu-
tion ever would have condoned abridging the most intimate of rights
they sought to preserve, the freedom of political expression, in ex-
change for a free press. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court
places freedom of political expression at the top of the list of consti-
tutionally protected rights.4 According to the United States Supreme
Court, the most protected form of speech is political speech, because
without free political speech one cannot have a true democracy.
5
"[S]peech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is
the essence of self-government." 6 Yet, despite the protection given
to the freedom of political expression, courts have recently begun to
abridge this right when balancing it against the freedom of the press.
7
Media corporations have successfully asserted the free press provi-
sions of the United States Constitution as a defense to state laws pro-
hibiting discrimination against employees based on outside political
activities.
8
Journalists are often among the most politically inclined indi-
viduals. Arguably, they are also among the individuals most fit to
make political decisions because they have investigated both sides of
the story and are therefore more able to make a balanced and in-
formed decision. In spite of journalists' unique characteristics, many
courts have upheld actions taken by corporate media entities
(discussing ABC News's policy prohibiting employees from "'active support
of electoral politics'); Kelley Griffin, Journalism Serves Civic Role, DENV.
POST, Aug. 7, 1997, at B 11 (discussing a reporter's reassignment by Colorado
Public Radio because of the conflict of interest created by her husband's run
for governor).
4. See WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE, FIRST AMENDMENT CASES AND
MATERIALS 21 (2d ed. 1991).
5. See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) ("The mainte-
nance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that govern-
ment may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be ob-
tained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security of the
Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system.").
6. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964).
7. See, e.g., Nelson v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 936 P.2d 1123
(Wash.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 175 (1997) (holding that the First Amend-
ment's free speech clauses permit a newspaper to restrict the political activities
of its journalists).
8. See infra Part III.
FREE SPEECH VS. FREE PRESS
resulting in the political silencing of journalists.9 Thus, the courts'
recent trend indirectly encourages journalists to have greater loyalty
to media corporations and their agendas, rather than to their cities,
states, country, or individual beliefs.
This Note discusses how broadcast journalists will be impacted
by a recent case validating the corporate policy of a newspaper that
abridged the political rights of one of its journalists. Part II of this
Note will discuss the treatment of such corporate policies by the
courts historically, and the similar policies that a news station might
promulgate to prohibit the outside activities of broadcast journalists.
The focus of this Note will be on the recent Washington Supreme
Court case, Nelson v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc.,' 0 discussed in
detail in Part III. Part IV explains why this recent decision is un-
sound. Part V discusses the ramifications Nelson will have on the
rights of broadcast journalists by opening the door to the political
gerrymandering of journalists by news stations. Finally, Part VI dis-
cusses ways in which news stations can achieve their corporate goals
without infringing on the political freedoms of their journalists.
II. BACKGROUND1 1
Restrictions on journalists' outside political activities are a re-
cent trend founded on the concept of objectivity in news gathering.
12
Current restrictions were prompted by a change in the nature of news
gathering caused mainly by new incentives for profit making.13
Political objectives and money were the driving forces behind
early American newspapers.14 As a result, the press contained very
little objectivity.'5 For example, the standard form of newspaper
writing in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries consisted of what
9. See infra Part III.
10. 936 P.2d 1123 (Wash.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 175 (1997).
11. For an extensive look at the historical development of American jour-
nalism, especially print journalism, see Jason P. Isralowitz, Comment, The Re-
porter as Citizen: Newspaper Ethics and Constitutional Values, 141 U. PA. L.
REV. 221 (1992).
12. See BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY 129-30 (3d ed. 1990).
13. See id.
14. See HAZEL DICKEN-GARCIA, JOURNALISTIC STANDARDS IN NINE-
TEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 30-32 (1989).
15. See id.
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are today referred to as "editorials."' 6 As a matter of fact, partisan-
ship in newspapers did not begin to wane until the middle of the
nineteenth century when the cost of manufacturing newspapers
dropped, and objectivity became a useful marketing strategy for
many newspapers in obtaining advertisers.' 7 The commercial im-
perative of attracting advertisers and increasing revenue ushered in
the era of objectivity in the press. 18 Thus, the driving force behind
objectivity was not the constitutional right to a free press,' 9 but rather
profitability. These commercial objectives explain why the press
promulgated restrictions on political activity to promote the appear-
ance of objectivity.
The early cases in which journalists contested political restric-
tions stem from the middle of this century, during the Cold War era
of anticommunist fervor in America. This period, known as the
McCarthy Era, witnessed the indictment of numerous individuals
from a cross-section of the American population, including reporters,
film directors, and screenwriters.
A number of news organizations fired employees during the
McCarthy Era for alleged communist affiliations.20 Journalists were
fired for such things as refusing to testify before the House Un-
American Activities Committee.2' Newspapers sought to justify
16. See Gerald J. Baldasty, The Nineteenth-Century Origins of Modern
American Journalism, in THREE HUNDRED YEARS OF THE AMERICAN
NEWSPAPER 407, 408-09 (John B. Hench ed., 1991) (stating that "partisanship
[in newspaper content] was deemed a badge of honor and integrity").
17. See MICHAEL SCHUDSON, DISCOvERING THE NEWS: A SOCIAL
HISTORY OF AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS 18-19 (1978).
18. See BAGDIKIAN, supra note 12, at 129, 130. See also HERBERT J.
GANS, DECIDING WHAT'S NEWS 186 (1979) (stating "the Associated Press is
often credited with having invented objectivity in order to sell uniform wire-
service news to a politically and otherwise diverse set of local newspapers").
19. "Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
20. See Mark T. Carroll, Note, Protecting Private Employees' Freedom of
Political Speech, 18 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 35, 73 (1981).
21. See Hearst Publ'g Co., 30 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 642 (1958) (Schedler,
Arb.); see also New York Times Co., 26 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 609, 611
(1956) (Corsi, Arb.) (holding that The Times had good cause for dismissing a
foreign desk copyreader who acknowledged past membership in the commu-
nist party); United Press Ass'n, 22 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 679, 683 (1954)
(Spiegelberg, Arb.) (stating that United Press would have been justified for
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these firings with claims of the appearance of a lack of objectivity
and credibility in the eyes of newspaper readers. 22 Arbitrators up-
held these discharges on "[t]he theory ...that newspapers, which
have a great responsibility to the public to present objective news,
untainted by Communist propaganda, are justified in requiring ab-
solute certainty in their employees' willingness to present unslanted
news."
23
Several cases also exist that address the rights of employees in
other areas of media, including television and film. Until recently,
employment contracts frequently contained provisions requiring em-
ployees to avoid conduct that is prejudicial to the employer's inter-24
ests. These were called morals clauses. Morals clauses played a
prominent role in a line of cases affecting directors and screenwriters
during the McCarthy Era. Courts ruled that these individuals were
properly discharged for violating morals clause provisions by en-
gaging in political activity that was, or appeared to be, communist.
25
For example, in one case a screenwriter was suspended for refusing
to testify before a Congressional committee about whether he was a
member of the Communist Party.26 The court upheld the employer's
action based on the employment contract.27 The screenwriter had
contractually agreed "to conduct himself with due regard to public
conventions and morals" by avoiding activity tending to degrade him
or "bring him into public hatred, contempt, scorn, or ridicule."28 The
contract also stated that he would do nothing that would "tend to
shock, insult or offend the community or ridicule public morals or
decency, or prejudice the producer or the motion picture, theatrical or
discharging a reporter who refused to testify before Un-American Activities
Committee had it specified that its concern was that readers would infer bias);
Los Angeles Daily News, 19 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 39, 40 (1952) (Dodd,
Arb.) (upholding the firing of two editorial writers who refused to deny com-
munist affiliation charges).
22. See Carroll, supra note 20, at 73-74 & n.195.
23. Id. at 73 n.195 (citations omitted).
24. See Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Liability for Discharge of Employee from
Private Employment on Ground of Political Views or Conduct, 38 A.L.R. 5th
39, 52-54 (1996).
25. See id.
26. See Loew's, Inc. v. Cole, 185 F.2d 641, 645 (9thCir. 1950).
27. See id. at 661-62.
28. Id. at 645.
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radio industry in general. 29 The Loew's, Inc. v. Cole court found
that the screenwriter had breached the contractual provision by re-
fusing to testify.30 The court concluded that a jury could reasonably
find that the screenwriter's refusal to testify as to his communist in-
volvement gave the Congressional committee and the public the im-
pression that he was a communist.31
Similarly, the court in Scott v. RKO Radio Pictures32 held that a
director breached his employment contract by refusing to testify be-
fore the Congressional committee regarding his communist involve-
ment.33 The court reasoned that the conduct of the director tended to
offend the community and caused the public to believe the movie in-
dustry was shielding communists.
34
Many collective bargaining agreements that are in place today
for various media unions-such as the American Federation of Tele-
vision and Radio Artists, the Screen Actors Guild, the Writers Guild
of America, and the Directors Guild of America-prohibit morals
clauses such as those found in McCarthy Era employment con-
tracts. 35 Provisions prohibiting morals clauses are especially impor-
tant because many of the news reporters, writers, and directors
working at news stations are union members. Thus, the provisions of
union collective bargaining agreements can work to the advantage of
broadcast journalists when they file grievances for interference with
their outside political activities.36
29. Id. at 649 n.6.
30. See id. at 658.
31. See id. at 649. See also Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Lardner,
216 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1954) (upholding an employer's discharge of a screen-
writer for violating a contract clause by refusing to testify before a congres-
sional committee).
32. 240 F.2d 87 (9th Cir. 1957).
33. See id. at 90-91.
34. See id.
35. For example, see DIRECTORS GUILD OF AMERICA, INC., 1993 BASIC
AGREEMENT § 17-123 (1993).
36. See, e.g., Knoxville Newspaper Guild, Local 376 v. The Knoxville
News-Sentinel Co., A.A.A. No. 30 30 0069 83, 20 (June 10, 1983) (Duff, Arb.)
(stating that "[tihe expression of political beliefs by activities, such as running
for office of School Board Director, involves a person's civil rights and cannot
be restricted by an Employer except for some proven compelling reason").
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After the period of the McCarthy Era cases, the Vietnam War
"sparked a rebirth of political activism among journalists., 37 Some
individual reporters participated openly in political demonstrations
and expressed their personal opinions publicly.38 Journalists also
played a role in exposing the Watergate scandal. 39 At this point,
journalism industry leaders expressed discomfort with the idea of
politically influential reporting.40 As a result, newspaper publishers
began adopting conflict of interest restrictions and promulgating
codes of ethics designed to allay concerns about the involvement of
journalists in politics.4 1 In the 1980s the number of newspapers with
nonparticipation guidelines dramatically increased.42
Today, while many newspapers maintain codes of ethics, televi-
sion news broadcasters are also beginning to adopt their own sets of
codes.43 The trend is toward more restrictions on journalists' activi-
ties. Furthermore, courts have generally upheld these restrictions.
Only a small number of cases have spawned victories for journalists,
most of which were settled out of court.44
A news station is likely to promulgate policies that prohibit
journalists from running for political office, becoming involved in
political or social causes, making campaign contributions, and taking
sides on political or social issues.45 In theory, these provisions could
possibly influence journalists' voting rights or decisions.46 Also, the
network's policies may not require a showing that the prohibited
37. Isralowitz, supra note 11, at 228.
38. See id.
39. See MICHAEL SCHUDSON, WATERGATE IN AMERICAN MEMORY 105
(1992).
40. See id. at 114.
41. See Isralowitz, supra note 11, at 229.
42. See Schneider & Gunther, supra note 1, at 55.
43. See supra note 3; see also Schneider & Gunther, supra note 1, at 55
(discussing codes of ethics promulgated by newspapers and broadcasters).
44. See Abortion Foe Wins Action Against Paper, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 6, 1989,
at 14 (discussing an out-of-court settlement won by a reporter against The
Milwaukee Journal); Iowa: Des Moines, USA TODAY, Apr. 21, 1992, at 6A
(discussing how two ex-editors won an out-of-court settlement against The
Fairfield Ledger).
45. See, e.g., supra note 3.
46. See Isralowitz, supra note 11, at 237-40.
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activity actually interfered with the objectivity of the reporter.47 The
mere appearance of a conflict of interest or an interference with ob-
jectivity might be sufficient to qualify an activity as prohibited.48
The argument against these ambiguous policies is that they open the
door for corporate manipulation of the political process. In other
words, they can be used to further a political agenda while appearing
to encourage journalistic objectivity.
III. NELSON V. MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS, INC.
49
Thus far, no case has dealt directly with the rights of broadcast
journalists to engage in political activities outside of working hours,
though many believe that the same issues and arguments that apply
to print journalists also apply to broadcast journalists. 50 The Nelson
case is a recent state court decision that impacts the political rights of
print journalists. Broadcast journalists, however, are also affected by
the Nelson decision because of the broad language of the court's
opinion.
A. Facts
Sandra Nelson began working as a reporter for The News Trib-
une, (TNT), in Tacoma, Washington in 1983.51 In 1986 McClatchy
Newspapers acquired TNT and decided to keep Nelson as a reporter,
assigning her to cover the education beat.52 Nelson's job focused on
"Tacoma schools as well as regional and state educational issues."
53
Nelson was an accomplished reporter who had won awards for her
work,54 but she engaged in activities outside her job with which TNT
did not agree.55 Nelson, a "self-professed" lesbian, spent much of
47. See id. at 247.
48. See id. See generally Schneider & Gunther, supra note 1, at 55 (dis-
cussing conflict of interest restrictions affecting journalists that cover various
activities).
49. 936 P.2d 1123 (Wash.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 175 (1997).
50. See Isralowitz, supra note 11, at 221 & n.3.
51. See Nelson, 936 P.2d at 1124.
52. See id.
53. Id.
54. See Media Can Ban Reporter Activism, 5 MEDIA & LAW 4, Feb. 28,
1997.
55. See Nelson, 936 P.2d at 1125.
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her off-duty time participating in political activities.56 Nelson's po-
litical activism included attending "political fora, demonstrations,
and classes for political causes including highly visible support for
gay and lesbian rights, feminist issues, and abortion rights." 57 Ta-
coma Radical Women, a feminist socialist organization of which
Nelson was a member and an organizer, provided support for much
of Nelson's political activism.58 Nelson was also a member of the
Freedom Socialist Party.59 Nevertheless, McClatchy was aware of
Nelson's political activism when it chose to retain her as a reporter.
60
In 1987, a TNT reporter and photographer saw Nelson picketing
for abortion rights outside a local hospital. 61 TNT management sub-
sequently told Nelson that such activity compromised the newspa-
per's appearance of objectivity.62 Nelson, in response, stated that
"she would continue her public political activity . . ." and in 1989,
she "helped launch a ballot initiative to have an antidiscrimination
ordinance reinstated following its repeal. 63  Nelson openly pro-
moted the initiative throughout 1990 by organizing volunteers, solic-
iting support, arranging for speakers, organizing rallies, and collect-
ing signatures for the initiative. 64 Throughout the year, the initiative
battle was a major political story, and its notoriety increased as the
fall election approached.65 TNT's editors informed Nelson on
August 15, 1990, that they would transfer her from her position as
education reporter to swing shift copy editor until the November
elections were over.
66
As swing shift copy editor, Nelson maintained her salary, bene-
fits, and seniority.67 The new nonmanagerial position required the
same general qualifications as a reporter and involved editing a wide
56. See id.
57. Id.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. Id.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id.
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variety of local and national news accounts, but Nelson no longer
worked as a beat reporter investigating and writing stories.68 In Oc-
tober 1993, Nelson wrote to her TNT supervisor requesting that the
paper reinstate her as a reporter.69 She later applied for such a posi-
tion.70 Nelson's transfer to the new position became permanent,
however, when she refused to end her political activism.
71
Nelson's political activity continued into 1994, when she ac-
tively opposed a ballot initiative preventing municipalities from ex-
tending civil rights to gays and lesbians. 72 During that year she also
testified on behalf of the "Stonewall Committee" before the Wash-
ington State Legislature in support of a gay and lesbian civil rights
bill.73 Nelson's testimony before the state legislature received front
page coverage in TNT and many other state newspapers. 74 A state
legislator, who knew Nelson was a TNT employee, inquired with
TNT as to whether Nelson was lobbying the legislature on behalf of
TNT. 75
TNT's editors responded by writing to Nelson, stating "[w]e are
dismayed and concerned that you have taken your political activism
to a new and larger arena." 76 The editors also wrote that Nelson's
activities "jeopardized the credibility of TNT in the eyes of its read-
ers and the Legislature alike."77 They further expressed that their
discomfort with Nelson's activities was not because of the subject
matter, since TNT editorials had adopted pro-gay positions on sev-
eral occasions. 78 TNT concluded by informing Nelson that if her
political activism continued to compromise TNT's credibility, "it
would be forced to 'further isolate' [Nelson] and to take 'appropriate
disciplinary action.'
79
68. See id.
69. See id. at 1126.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 1125.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 1125-26.
75. See id. at 1126.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See id.
79. Id.
FREE SPEECH VS. FREE PRESS
Nelson asked TNT in January of 1995 to consider her for an un-
announced education reporter position. 0 TNT had hired nine other
reporters since Nelson's transfer to swing shift copy editor, and Nel-
son alleged that TNT made it clear that positions would remain
closed to her so long as she was involved in high profile political ac-
tivism.
8 1
Nelson filed suit in Pierce County Superior Court alleging that
her transfer out of the reporter position was an improper action by
TNT. 2 Nelson claimed that TNT did the following: (1) violated
Washington Revised Code section 42.17.680(2) of the Fair Cam-
paign Practices Act which prohibits discrimination by employers
against employees who support initiatives, political parties, or politi-
cal committees;8 (2) violated article I, sections 4,84 5," 19,86 and ar-
ticle II, section 187 of the Washington Constitution; (3) breached her
employment contract by transferring her without good cause; and (4)
wrongfully transferred her because TNT's restrictions on her off-
duty political activities violated public policy.
88
Pierce County Superior Court granted TNT's summary judg-
ment motion on Nelson's claim under RCW 42.17.680 and on all of
Nelson's constitutional claims.89 Nelson's breach of employment
and wrongful transfer claims survived, however, and went to trial on
remand.90 Thus, the issue on appeal before the Washington Supreme
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See WASH. REv. CODE § 42.17.680(2) (West 1992). This section
states:
No employer or labor organization may discriminate against an officer
or employee in the terms or conditions of employment for (a) the fail-
ure to contribute to, (b) the failure in any way to support or oppose, or
(c) in any way supporting or opposing a candidate, ballot proposition,
political party, or political committee.
Id.
84. See WASH. CONST. art. I, § 4 (freedom to assemble and petition gov-
emment).
85. See id § 5 (right to free speech).
86. See id. § 19 (guarantee of free elections).
87. See id. art. II, § 1 (popular right to initiative).
88. See Nelson, 936 P.2d at 1126.
89. See id.
90. See id.
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Court was whether the trial court's dismissal of Nelson's statutory
and constitutional claims was proper.
91
B. The Court's Reasoning
The Washington Supreme Court initially recognized that one of
TNT's fundamental goals as a news publication was the appearance
of objectivity in the eyes of its readers. 92 TNT's 1987 ethics code
regulated activity deemed to present apparent or actual conflicts of
interest.93 Conflicts of interest, as defined by the ethics code, "in-
clude[d] all situations in which readers might be led to believe that
the news reporting [was] biased, including situations in which re-
porters participate[d] in high profile political activity."94 The court
stated that TNT had transferred Nelson because she had violated
TNT's ethics code.
95
After describing TNT's ethics code, the court reviewed the
commonality of journalistic codes of ethics and conduct that mini-
mized conflicts of interest.96 The court cited a 1983 Ohio University
study indicating that seventy-five percent of news organizations have
similar codes in place.97 The court quoted from a code of ethics
maintained by The Washington Post for its newsroom employees that
was identical to TNT's.98 The code cautioned employees to "avoid
active involvement in any partisan causes-politics, community af-
fairs, social action, demonstrations-that could compromise or seem
to compromise our ability to report and edit fairly."99 The court,
91. See id.
92. See id. at 1124-25.
93. See id. at 1125.
94. Id.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See id. (citing Isralowitz, supra note 11, at 229). By contrast, more than
20 years prior to the Nelson case, a 1974 Associated Press Managing Editors
survey found that less than 10% of newspapers had such guidelines. See
Schneider & Gunther, supra note 1, at 55. Whereas in September 1992, even
the traditionally liberal MTV directed its employees covering the presidential
campaign to refrain from making significant contributions to candidates. See
Judith Miller, But Can You Dance to It?: MTV Turns to News, N.Y. TIMES
MAGAZINE, Oct. 11, 1992, at 30.
98. See Nelson, 936 P.2d at 1125.
99. Benjamin C. Bradlee, Standards andEthics, in THE WASHINGTON POST
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however, did not address the history of ethics codes restraining po-
litical activity in the press, or the lack thereof, but rather only dis-
cussed the recent trend in the promulgation of these codes.
1. The Washington Fair Campaign Practices Act
The Washington Supreme Court first addressed whether section
42.17.680(2) of the Fair Campaign Practices Act applied to an "em-
ployee who is discriminated against for refusing to abstain from po-
litical involvement.' 100 The court resolved this issue by first deter-
mining whether such employer actions fell within the scope of the
statutory prohibition against removing an employee for "'supporting
or opposing' a ballot initiative, political party or committee. ' ° 1 Due
to the scarcity of legislative history interpreting the statute, together
with the absence of case law, the court had to use its own discretion
in assessing the two options the parties advocated for interpreting the
statute.
102
Nelson argued the court should look at the plain language of the
statute.10 3 Using this approach, the court reasoned that subsections
(2)(b) and (2)(c) afforded protection to employees in two different
scenarios. 0 The court first determined that subsection (2)(b), which
states that "no employer may discriminate against an employee for
the 'failure in any way to support or oppose' a candidate, ballot
DESKBOOK ON STYLE 1, 3 (Thomas W. Lippman ed., 2d ed. 1989). The court
also noted the Society of Professional Journalist's 1973 Code of Ethics which
reads:
Secondary employment, political involvement, holding public office,
and service in community organizations should be avoided if it com-
promises the integrity of journalists and their employers. Journalists
and their employers should conduct their personal lives in a manner
which protects them from conflict of interest, real or apparent. Their
responsibilities to the public are paramount. That is the nature of their
profession.
See Nelson, 936 P.2d. at 1125 (citing SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL
JOURNALISTS, SIGMA DELTA CI CODE OF ETHICS (1973), reprinted in Lynn
W. Hartman, Comment, Standards Governing the News: Their Use, Their
Character, and Their Legal Implications, 72 IOWA L. REV. 637 app. C at 697
(1986)).
100. Nelson, 936 P.2d at 1126.
101. Id.
102. See id. at 1126-27.
103. See id. at 1127.
104. See id.
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proposition, political party, or political committee[,]' 05 logically ap-
plies when an "employee fails to adopt and support the employer's
political position."'10 6 The court then determined that subsection
(2)(c), which states that "no employer may discriminate against an
employee for 'in any way supporting or opposing a candidate, ballot
proposition, political party, or political committee' . . . appl[ies]
when the employee refuses to abstain from political activity." 7 The
court felt that there was no other rational meaning for subsection
(2)(c).108
TNT argued that the court should read the section's language in
context with the entire statute and to construe it in a manner consis-
tent with the statute's general purpose.10 9 TNT asserted that subsec-
tion (2)(c) read in context, has a narrower meaning and would apply
only in situations where "an employer attempts to strong-arm an em-
ployee into adopting its political position."110 TNT also argued that
Washington's labor law already forbade "discrimination against an
employee on the basis of age, sex, marital status, race, creed, color,
national origin, or physical handicap.""' TNT argued that Nelson's
reading created a protected political activist category, but located it
in the campaign finance reform law rather than in the labor or civil
rights laws.' TNT questioned this placement of the provision. 113
While the trial court agreed with TNT's interpretation of the
statute, the Washington Supreme Court did not." The supreme
court relied on the history and the purpose of the statute-which was
known as Initiative 134 before it was passed by a popular vote in
1992 with a seventy-two percent margin-to conclude that Nelson's
interpretation was correct." 5 The court acknowledged that "[o]ne of
105. Id. (citing WASH. REv. CODE § 42.17.680(2)(b) (1992)).
106. Id.
107. Id. (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.680(2)(c) (1992)).
108. See id.
109. See id. (citing Nationwide Papers, Inc. v. Northwest Egg Sales, Inc.,
416 P.2d 687, 689 (Wash. 1966)).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1128 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.180 (1990)).
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 1126-28.
115. See id. at 1127-28.
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the stated purposes of [Initiative 134] was to prevent financially
strong organizations from exercising a disproportionate or control-
ling influence [over] elections." 116 The court added that TNT's in-
terpretation did not track the text of the act and that:
When read in context [RCW 42.17.680] has a clear relation
to the rest of the campaign finance reform act; it is meant to
prevent employers from wielding their might to influence
politics and elections. The law is part of campaign finance,
not civil rights or labor law. Taken as a whole, the provi-
sion in question means that employers may not dispropor-
tionately influence politics by forcing their employees to
support their position or by attempting to force political ab-
stinence on politically active employees. The law is de-
signed to restrict organizations from wielding political in-
fluence by manipulating the political influence of their
employees through employment decisions."i
7
The court found that section 42.17.680(2) applied to Nelson's
case and turned to a discussion of the statute's constitutionality."1
8
2. Constitutionality of the Washington Fair Campaign Practices Act
In spite of the court's finding that section 42.17.680(2) applied
to Nelson, the court found the statute unconstitutional under both the
United States and Washington Constitutions. 19 TNT argued that
section 42.17.680(2) violated the First Amendment 120 to the United
States Constitution and article I, section 5121 of the Washington Con-
stitution. 122 Specifically, TNT asserted that the free press clause of
the two constitutions guaranteed it "editorial discretion to control the
content of its publication."' 23 TNT argued, further, that an integral
component of editorial discretion involves controlling the
116. Id. at 1128 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.610(1) (1993)).
117. Id.
118. See id.
119. See id. at 1128-29.
120. "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press ....." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
121. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 5 states, "Every person may freely speak, write
and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right."
122. See Nelson, 936 P.2d at 1128-29.
123. Id. at 1129.
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newspaper's credibility. 124 In essence, TNT asserted that a constitu-
tionally protected characteristic of the press was editorial integrity. 125
In response, Nelson argued that TNT reporters' conduct outside of
work was unrelated to the content and credibility of TNT or the free
press clauses of the respective constitutions.
126
The court found that the First Amendment and the Washington
Constitution protected TNT's editorial discretion by giving them the
"'right to protect the newspaper's unbiased content, both [through]
its facts and as perceived by its readers, its sources, and its advertis-
ers. ' ,"127 The court agreed with the trial court's reasoning that in or-
der for TNT to protect its credibility, it could force its employees to
be politically neutral. 128 The court based its conclusions on several
different factors.
First, the court reiterated the importance of free speech in our
society. 29 The court also recognized the historical importance of
free press and the vehement protection that written press received
over other types of media. 130 Next, the court referred to the trend of
affording greater First Amendment protection that the United States
Supreme Court and some state courts have recently espoused.
131
Among the cases the court cited were Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston'32 and R.A. V v. City of St.
Paul.
133
In addressing whether governmental regulation affecting the
press violated TNT's constitutional free press protection, the court
recognized two polar governing principles and attempted to consider
where the action complained of fell in this case. 134  The first
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. Id. (quoting trial court opinion).
128. See id. (citing trial court opinion).
129. See id.
130. See id. at 1129-30.
131. See id. at 1130.
132. 515 U.S. 557, 578-81 (1995) (stating that a state law requiring parade
organizers to allow a gay group to march unconstitutionally infringes on the
organizers' free speech).
133. 505 U.S. 377, 396 (1992) (invalidating St. Paul's hate speech "Bias-
Motivated Crime Ordinance" because it violated free speech).
134. See Nelson, 936 P.2d at 1130-31.
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principle the court discussed was that a newspaper "has 'no special
immunity from the application of general laws' simply because it is
the press."'135 The second principle, the extreme opposite of the first,
prohibits the government from regulating the content of a newspa-
per.136 The court adopted the second principle.
137
In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,138 the United States
Supreme Court struck down a Florida "right-of-access" statute that
forced a newspaper to publish responses of politicians it had previ-
ously criticized. 139 The main principle established in Tornillo was
that editors of a newspaper must be free to exercise editorial control
and discretion. 140 The Court in Tornillo also stated that newspapers
are "more than ...passive receptacle[s] or conduit[s] for news,
comment, and advertising." 141 Instead, decisions about the material
contained in a newspaper, limitations on the size and content of the
newspaper, "and [the] treatment of public issues and public officials.
. . constitute the exercise of editorial control and judgment."'142 The
Court concluded that because the Florida statute deprived the news-
paper of its editorial discretion, it was necessarily unconstitutional as
applied to the newspaper. 143 Similarly, the Nelson court established
that editorial control is a necessary component of the free press, and
a state law infringing upon that control is unconstitutionally ap-
plied.144
The court also briefly discussed several other related cases. In
Passaic Daily News v. NLRB, 145 the United States Court of Appeals,
District of Columbia Circuit, held that it was unconstitutional to re-
quire a newspaper to publish a reporter's column as a remedy for
unlawful termination because doing so would interfere with the
135. Id. (quoting Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132
(1937)).
136. See id. at 1131 (citing Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S.
241,258 (1974)).
137. See id. at 1131.
138. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
139. See id. at 258.
140. See id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See id.
144. See Nelson, 936 P.2d at 1131, 1133.
145. 736 F.2d 1543 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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paper's editorial function. 146 The same court, in Newspaper Guild of
Greater Philadelphia v. NLRB, 147 stated that editorial integrity is to a
newspaper what machinery is to a manufacturer, and that "credibility
is central to [the] ultimate product [of most news publications] and to
the conduct of the enterprise.' 148 The court noted that control of
credibility falls within the sphere of First Amendment protection and,
therefore, laws infringing on this control must be scrutinized. 149 The
Newspaper Guild court further announced the principle that:
In order to preserve [integrity and credibility], a news pub-
lication must be free to establish without interference, rea-
sonable rules designed to prevent its employees from en-
gaging in activities which may directly compromise their
standing as responsible journalists and that of the publica-
tion for which they work as a medium of integrity.' 50
For example, requiring a reporter to choose between writing for
a nationally syndicated column and participating "in a national po-
litical campaign as a prominent party official" does not violate this
principle.' 51 The court did state, however, that the degree of control
"is not open-ended, but must be narrowly tailored to the protection of
the core purposes of the enterprise."'
152
The Nelson court found that the Newspaper Guild case was "di-
rectly on point."'153 It found that TNT designed its no-conflict-of-
interest policy to uphold its credibility, and thus the policy merited
protection under the state and federal constitutions.
154
The court rejected Nelson's claim that Associated Press v.
NLRB 55 supported her position. 56 In Associated Press, the newspa-
per fired one of its editors for attempting to unionize the work
146. See id. at 1558-59.
147. 636 F.2d 550 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
148. Id. at 560.
149. See id.
150. Id. at 561 (footnotes omitted).
151. Id. at 563 n.50.
152. Id. at 561 n.36.
153. Nelson, 936 P.2d at 1132.
154. See id.
155. 301 U.S. 103 (1937).
156. See Nelson, 936 P.2d at 1132.
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force. 157 The NLRB argued that the firing violated the National La-
bor Relations Act, (NLRA), which specifically grants workers the
right to form, join, and participate in labor unions.' 58 The Court, by
a five to four vote, found that the NLRA was constitutional and that
firing the editor violated the NLRA. 5 9 The court held that unioniza-
tion had "no relation whatever" to the newspaper's free press
rights. 160 It concluded that union membership, and not editorial pre-
rogative, truly motivated the firing.1
61
Nelson argued that TNT's code of ethics regulating high profile
employee activity did not affect the newspaper's core function, and
that her transfer, like the discharge in Associated Press, was not
protected by the free press clauses. 62 The court in Nelson, however,
distinguished Associated Press by limiting its holding to the NLRA
and union activity, and further negated the weight of its authority by
relegating it to the historical context of the New Deal Era.163 It is
important to keep in mind, however, that Associated Press was good
law when the court decided Nelson.
On October 6, 1997, the United States Supreme Court denied
Nelson's petition for writ of certiorari.' 64 Nelson continues to work
at TNT as a swing shift copy editor. Even though she still has the
same benefits as a beat reporter, she is not permitted to perform her
original job duties. Sandra Nelson cannot freely exercise her passion
for beat reporting, merely because she openly advocates political
views different from those of her employer.
IV. ANALYZING WHY THE NELSON COURT WAS WRONG
The majority opinion in Nelson balanced the individual First
Amendment right of free speech against the corporate First Amend-
ment right of free press. The majority carved out a special exception
for TNT in the Nelson case, however, because it is a newspaper, even
157. See Associated Press, 301 U.S. at 125.
158. See id. at 123. The National Labor Relations Act's grant of this right
appears in 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994).
159. See Associated Press, 301 U.S. at 125-30.
160. Id. at 133.
161. See id. at 132.
162. See Nelson, 936 P.2d at 1132.
163. See id.
164. See Nelson v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 175 (1997).
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though it is a commercial entity. 16 5 The majority treated individual
political expression as less valuable than corporate free press. Such a
hierarchical analysis was improper because the majority failed to
recognize the United States Supreme Court's informal order of pro-
tected First Amendment rights, which places individual political
speech at the top of the list of protected rights.
166
The majority also disregarded the numerous cases in which the
Supreme Court held that the First Amendment's freedom of press
right does not necessarily insulate the press from enforcement of
statutes of general applicability. 167 This principle grew out of the
holding in the Associated Press168 case cited by the majority opin-
ion.' 69 In Associated Press, the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he
publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity from the applica-
tion of general laws."'170 Applying this rationale, both TNT's asser-
tion and the Nelson majority's finding that the right to a free press
insulates it from Washington law was erroneous. The majority
should have prohibited TNT from discriminating against Nelson for
165. Individual political speech is at the core of protected First Amendment
speech. See VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 4, at 32. Commercial speech, although
protected by the United States Supreme Court, is not protected nearly as much
as individual political speech. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976).
166. See VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 4, at 32. The Supreme Court has not
formally stated an order of protected rights, but in its opinions the Court has
made clear that core political speech is the most protected type of speech. See
Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257 (1974); Mills v. Ala-
bama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966).
167. See Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 130-33 (1937) (holding
that the discharge of an employee was prohibited under the NLRA and that
such a prohibition was not an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of the
press); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 7 (1945) (holding that
publishers are equally subject to antitrust laws); Oklahoma Press Publ'g Co. v.
Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 192-93 (1946) (holding that applying the Fair Labor
Standards Act in publishing contexts does not violate the First Amendment);
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376,
391 (1973) (holding that an ordinance prohibiting sex-designated advertising
for non-exempt job opportunities did not violate a newspaper's First Amend-
ment rights).
168. 301 U.S. 103 (1937).
169. See Nelson v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 936 P.2d 1123, 1132
(Wash. 1997).
170. Associated Press, 301 U.S. at 132.
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her political activities, just as the majority would have done if TNT
were not a newspaper.
The majority in Nelson also implies that applying the Washing-
ton Fair Campaign Practices Act to the press would amount to gov-
ernment control of its content. 17 1 In this regard, the majority's rea-
soning is suspect because the Act does not direct the press to make
certain contextual decisions, but rather directs the employment deci-
sions of companies like TNT. 172 Unlike Tornillo,173 the Act in Nel-
son did not require TNT to publish or print anything, but merely re-
quired that it not discriminate against its employees based on
political activity or inactivity. 74 Thus, the Nelson court improperly
extended the Tornillo case to prohibit government regulation of the
press's employment practices.
The dissenting opinion in Nelson attacked numerous weaknesses
in the majority's reasoning. The dissent's main focus was that the
First Amendment only protects against "interference with a newspa-
per's right to determine what to print."'175 It criticized the blanket
immunity the majority of the court gave to the press. 176 The dissent
also did not recognize Nelson as an illustration of the conflict be-
tween the two "'polar principles' in First Amendment jurispru-
dence."'177 Rather, the dissenting justices reasoned that the govern-
ment would not regulate TNT's content by enforcing the statute.
178
There was no allegation that Nelson's political views influenced her
reporting or that the "application of the statute would impinge upon
[TNT's] exclusive right to determine [its content].' 79
The dissenting justices recognized the First Amendment ban on
government regulation of newspaper content; however, they were
unwilling to extend this ban to prohibit government regulation of a
171. See Nelson, 936 P.2d at 1129.
172. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.680(2) (1992). California has a code
similar to Washington's that prohibits discrimination by employers based on
political affiliation. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1101 (West 1989).
173. 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
174. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.680(2).
175. Nelson, 936 P.2d at 1133 (Dolliver, J., dissenting).
176. See id. (Dolliver, J., dissenting).
177. Id. (Dolliver, J., dissenting).
178. See id. (Dolliver, J., dissenting).
179. Id. (Dolliver, J., dissenting).
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newspaper's employment decisions.180 Using the reasoning in
Passaic Daily, the dissent drew a distinction between the regulation
of content and the regulation of employment decisions.181 In Passaic
Daily, as earlier discussed, the court of appeals held that demoting a
columnist due to his outside labor union activities was improper.
182
The court stated that even though the newspaper could not be forced
to print the reporter's weekly editorial column as a remedy for the
illegal demotion, the First Amendment did not insulate the newspa-
per from a federal statute prohibiting employers from discharging
employees for labor union activity.183 Thus, the Passaic Daily court
announced the distinction under the First Amendment between gov-
ernment regulation of the press's labor practices and government
regulation of editorial control.184 The court stated that the govern-
ment is permitted to regulate the former without violating the First
Amendment, but is prohibited from regulating the latter under the
First Amendment. 1
85
The dissenting justices in Nelson went on to criticize the major-
ity's assertion that "' [i]f a newspaper cannot be required to publish a
particular reporter's work, how can it be constitutionally required to
employ the individual as a reporter?"" 186 The dissent criticized the
majority because this was exactly what happened in Passaic Daily,
where the court did not require the newspaper to publish the column,
but did prohibit the newspaper from demoting the reporter due to his
activities. 187 Despite the similar holdings in Passaic Daily and Asso-
ciated Press, the Nelson majority briefly discussed Passaic Daily in
its opinion, but did not attempt to dismiss its applicability on the
same superfluous grounds as it dismissed Associated Press. Perhaps
this was due to the persuasiveness of Passaic Daily and the major-
ity's inability to rebut its precedential value.
180. See id. at 1134 (Dolliver, J., dissenting).
181. See id. (Dolliver, J., dissenting).
182. See Passaic Daily News v. NLRB, 736 F.2d 1543, 1555-56
(D.C. Cir. 1984).
183. See id. at 1556-58.
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. Nelson, 936 P.2d at 1134 (Dolliver, J., dissenting) (alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting majority opinion).
187. See id. (Dolliver, J., dissenting).
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The dissent concluded by stating that "[t]here has been no
showing that the newspaper's editorial control would be threatened
by [Nelson's] continued employment as a reporter."' 88 The dissent
analogized the employee in the Associated Press case-where the
Court said that there had been no allegation that the reporter's work
was biased' 89-to Nelson.190
As the dissent pointed out, the majority failed to recognize that
Nelson's reporting was not influenced by her political views.
191
Nevertheless, the majority based its holding on the rationale that
TNT has the right "to protect the newspaper's unbiased content, both
its facts and as perceived by its readers, its sources and its advertis-
ers." 192 This two prong rationale entails two principal policy justifi-
cations for restricting journalists' activities. The first is the im-
perative of joumalistic objectivity, which suggests that abstaining
from off-duty activities is necessary to avoid bias in reporting.
194
The second is institutional credibility, which assumes that "the mere
appearance of an ethical conflict will be harmful insofar as it may
lead readers to believe, even if erroneously, that content has been
skewed" or biased. 195
A. Objectivity
The journalistic objectivity rationale entails some discussion of
the merits of objectivity as the defining philosophy of modem
188. Id. (Dolliver, J., dissenting).
189. See Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 131 (1937).
190. See Nelson, 936 P.2d at 1134 (Dolliver, J., dissenting). The dissent rea-
soned much like the arbitrator in Knoxville Newspaper Guild, Local 3 76 v. The
Knoxville News-Sentinel Co., A.A.A. No. 30 30 0069 83, 20 (June 10, 1983)
(Duff, Arb.). In Knoxville Newspaper Guild, the arbitrator recognized objec-
tivity as a legitimate interest for the newspaper to have, but found inadequate
the newspaper's naked assertion that a journalist's election to a local school
board position endangered its objectivity. See id. at 21. The arbitrator stated
that the newspaper did not present any "credible evidence which would support
the... assertion that Mrs. McClary's election to office would be detrimental to
its perceived objectivity." Id.
191. See Nelson, 936 P.2d at 1133-34 (Dolliver, J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 1129 (emphasis added).
193. See Isralowitz, supra note 11, at 240.
194. See id.
195. Id.
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American journalism. Objectivity may itself be unattainable insofar
as it aspires to produce news accounts entirely free from journalists'
personal biases.' 96 After all, journalism itself is an inherently sub-
jective endeavor. 197 Thus, even works purporting to be free from
journalists' biases may subtly embody those biases. 98 Moreover, the
concept of objectivity in journalism may undermine itself because it
may lead journalists to rely overwhelmingly on official sources and
accept information from those sources without serious challenge.
199
This practice would hinder the media's ability to achieve diversity
and pluralism in its reports, possibly resulting in undue reliance on
official sources of information, to a point at which "the government
controls the press." 200 Requiring absolute objectivity assumes that
journalists do not have some item or affiliation lurking in their back-
ground that could compromise what a newspaper perceives as its in-
dependence. Nonetheless, "[j]ournalists are real people who live in
families, vote and cheer for the home team."
20 1
196. See ROBERT MIRALDI, MUCKRAKING AND OBJECTIVITY: JOURNAL-
ISM'S COLLIDING TRADITIONS 6, 15 (1990) (contrasting objective reporting to
muckraking).
197. See BAGDIKIAN, supra note 12, at 179 (stating that "[e]very basic step
in the journalistic process involves a value-laden decision").
198. See Donald McDonald, Is Objectivity Possible?, in ETHICS AND THE
PRESS 69, 70 (John C. Merrill & Ralph D. Barney eds., 1975).
199. See Jane Delano Brown et al., Invisible Power: Newspaper News
Sources and the Limits of Diversity, 64 JOURNALISM Q. at 45, 53 (1987). Ac-
cording to studies, reporters rely heavily on "government sources who are pri-
marily men in executive positions." Id. As one commentator states, "If gov-
ernmental statements are released or officials offer quotes for public
consumption which may be partially accurate or not at all, reporters and editors
should not parrot such information without adding a qualifying statement."
Charles L. Klotzer, The Unique Profession of Journalists Places a Special
Ethical Burden Upon Them, ST. LOUIS JOURNALISM REV., June 1, 1997, at 4.
200. Jeffrey B. Abramson, Four Criticisms of Press Ethics, in DEMOCRACY
AND THE MASS MEDIA 229, 254 (Judith Lichtenberg ed., 1990). Former Vice
President and Washington Bureau Chief for CBS News, Barbara Cochran,
states that people who come from a political life into journalism have actually
enriched the profession. See Talk Nation, supra note 3. She believes that for-
mer politicians are able to ask good questions because they love politics and
have had political training, know how politicians think, and can anticipate an-
swers and do a better job of questioning. See id.
201. Katherine C. McAdams, Non-Monetary Conflicts of Interest for News-
paper Journalists, 63 JOURNALISM Q. 700, 700 (1986).
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Restrictions on a journalist's outside activities should reflect that
there is not necessarily a correlation between a journalist's private
affiliations and activities and the content of the journalist's news
copy or report. The editing process at newspapers and in newsrooms
also undermines the majority's purported concern about journalists
injecting political biases into newspaper content.20 2  At least one
other person extensively edits a journalist's initial version of sto-
ies.2° Therefore, it is unlikely that personal bias would make it into
the final, published account.
204
B. Appearance of Objectivity
A rationale based on the appearance of objectivity is mainly
rooted in the importance of circulation and advertising. The fear is
that readers and advertisers may feel alienated as a result of publicity
surrounding journalists' private political affiliations.20 5 In essence,
"anything that appears to be a conflict is treated just as if it were a
real conflict. ' 20 6 Restrictions on outside activity are used by the
press as tools to shape public perception about their image and are
usually symbolic in nature.20 7 Accordingly, such restrictions are im-
plemented by the press as a public relations tool rather than as a
means of influencing journalistic objectivity.
20 8
The press's justifications, however, for restrictions based on the
appearance of objectivity are deficient. For example, the press may
actually impair its credibility by forcing journalists to distance them-
selves from the local communities they cover. The public may
202. Barbara Cochran also states that, "[n]o anchor writes all the copy that
he reads on an entire broadcast. That would simply be impossible." See Talk
Nation, supra note 3.
203. See GANS, supra note 18, at 189.
204. See id. Further, several television news stations report on the same is-
sue at any given time. See David Shaw, Instant Consensus: How Media Gives
Stories Same 'Spin,' L.A. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1989, at 1. Thus, editors and the
public can check their reporters' work against many reliable sources.
205. See GANS, supra note 18, at 186, 191.
206. H. EUGENE GOODWIN, GROPING FOR ETHICS IN JOURNALISM 298
(1983).
207. See David Pritchard & Madelyn Peroni Morgan, Impact of Ethics Codes
on Judgments by Journalists: A Natural Experiment, 66 JOURNALISM Q. 934,
941 (1989).
208. See id.
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actually alienate the press if its journalists fail to maintain involve-
ment in the community.0 9 If the public alienates the press because
of a lack of involvement in the community, then the press's claims
that its integrity and public image are threatened by outside activity
are undermined by the restrictions it imposes on its journalists. The
press might distance itself so much from the public that it will no
longer be effective as an outlet for the concerns of the communities it
serves.
210
The Nelson majority basically condones the press's concession
to its commercial interests and the loss of its independence. It is in
essence stating that the newspaper has the power, in the name of pre-
serving its credibility, to transfer Nelson merely because her private
or social affiliations are distasteful to the newspaper's advertisers.
211
The irony of this action reveals the inherent flaw in using the appear-
ance of objectivity as a rationale.
Interestingly, publishers and broadcasters who insist that their
staff members remain politically abstinent, have themselves been
found entangled in various political causes and affiliations.2 12 The
Gulf War vividly illustrated this form of hypocrisy by publishers and
broadcasters.2 13 Usually such biases on behalf of corporate owners
and management result from governmental2 14 and advertiser pres-
sures to engage in favorable coverage of issues.215 Thus, the outside
209. See WILLIAM GREIDER, WHO WILL TELL THE PEOPLE: THE BETRAYAL
OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 287-306 (1992). A study has identified lack of
involvement as a factor that could contribute to public alienation of the press.
See Cecilie Gaziano & Kristin McGrath, Newspaper Credibility and Relation-
ships of Newspaper Journalists to Communities, 64 JOURNALISM Q. 317, 328
(1987).
210. See GREIDER, supra note 209, at 287-306.
211. See Peerless Publications, Inc. v. Newspaper Guild of Greater Philadel-
phia, Local 10, 1977-1978 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 18,465 (Aug. 10, 1977) (Fan-
ning, Arb., dissenting) (stating that newspapers that discipline their employees
based on the concerns of their advertisers are "forcing [their] employees to
agree with [their] advertisers' ideas").
212. See BAGDIKIAN, supra note 12, at 3-4, 167.
213. See, e.g., Howard Rosenberg, TVs Flags and Yellow Ribbons, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 20, 1991, at A9 (commenting that much of television and news
was wrapped up in support for the Gulf War and that there was a lack of anti-
war sentiment from these sources).
214. See id.
215. See BAGDIKIAN, supra note 12, at 166-67 (stating that the continuing
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activities of the journalists are not what risk the integrity of the press
or skew media content, but rather the conflicts of the publishers and
the broadcasters. After all, ultimately it is "the media owners and
managers who determine which ideas and which version of the facts
shall reach the public. 216
V. THE IMPACT OF NELSON ON BROADCAST JOURNALISM: WIDENING
THE DOOR FOR POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING BY NEWS
CORPORATIONS
Indeed, the implications of Nelson are far reaching and affect the
political freedoms of broadcast journalists. The decision sets prece-
dent that other courts and arbitrators may rely on when faced with
similar issues concerning broadcast journalists. Further, by declining
to review the Nelson case, the United States Supreme Court leaves
the answer to this important issue unanswered. Since many of the
same issues that exist in print journalism also exist in broadcast jour-
nalism, courts are likely to apply the same legal principles-those
similar to the Nelson case-to broadcast journalism cases. For ex-
ample, a broadcast journalist will be barred from marching with the
local NAACP chapter outside of working hours in opposition to a
law affecting minorities if the news station decides to prohibit the
activity. The news station can rely on the Nelson case for legal sup-
port and will bolster its argument by claiming that because of the
nature of their work, the public is more likely to recognize broadcast
journalists than print journalists. The news station will argue that a
journalist's appearance at the march might send the impression that
the news station favors one group over another. Unfortunately, this
argument may prevail even though the true reason for the news sta-
tion's disapproval may be a conflict with its corporate ideals or those
of its advertisers.
The decision in Nelson has also opened the door for uneven ap-
plication of restrictions on broadcast journalists. For example, an
employer may arbitrarily prohibit some of its journalists from en-
gaging in activities that it disfavors, while allowing other employees
publisher restraint over certain subject matter stems from the fear of offending
advertisers).
216. MARTIN A. LEE & NORMAN SOLOMON, UNRELIABLE SOURCES: A
GUIDE TO DETECTING BIAS INNEWS MEDIA 93 (1990).
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to engage in activities that either benefit it, or to which it simply has
no objection.217 These instances are particularly prevalent when the
employee is a member of an unpopular group that is subject to wide-
spread prejudice. Accordingly, news stations have recently been
criticized for arbitrary application of restrictions on outside activ-
ity.218 For example, news stations seem to have a more permissive
set of codes for famous politicians who are hired as news anchors
and fluctuate between politics and journalism; other journalists on
the staff, however, have to abide by a much stricter set of rules.21 9
The former are given leeway to pursue outside activities because
they are signed on to gain ratings from viewers and increase adver-
tising, while the latter are restricted from outside activities by ethics
codes and are disciplined for involvement in them. 220 These double
standards are further perpetuated by the decision in Nelson, which
allows news stations to terminate or demote broadcast journalists un-
der the cloak of free press rights.
New York Republican Congresswoman Susan Molinari exem-
plifies the double standards that news stations have regarding con-
flicts. In 1997 Molinari left her seat in Congress to become an an-
chor for CBS News.221 CBS welcomed her with open arms and
without any concern for the appearance of bias that her presence may
reflect.222  As Howard Kurtz, reporter for The Washington Post,
pointed out, "[w]hat they [CBS] care about is a famous face. Susan
Molinari is a celebrity, therefore CBS sees this translating into rat-
ings. Therefore, [there was] no hesitation on [CBS's] part to not just
blur the line but to obliterate the line between journalism and
217. In Knoxville Newspaper Guild, Local 376 v. The Knoxville News-
Sentinel Co., A.A.A. No. 30 30 0069 83, 20 (June 10, 1983) (Duff, Arb.), the
newspaper fired a reporter because of her election to a local board of education
in a neighboring community. See Jonathan Friendly, Reporter DismissedAfter
Election to School Board, N.Y. TIMEs, June 15, 1983, at A16. The newspaper,
however, had allowed its editor to head a local parking authority, and its con-
servation reporter to serve on a national park commission. See Sandra R.
Gregg, Reporter's Firing Raises Rights Issue, WASH. POST, June 13, 1983, at
A2.
218. See Talk Nation, supra note 3.
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. See id.
222. See id.
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politics."223 This distinction makes it clear that, as long as there is
financial gain involved, even news stations can find exceptions to
their purportedly serious concern about the appearance of objectivity.
In fact, news stations are able to preserve their double standards by
relying on the Nelson decision when broadcast journalists protest
such activity.
The Nelson case also has strong implications for news station
employees other than journalists. For instance, news stations can ar-
gue that the news writing and directing staff also play integral roles
in the objectivity of the news and thus prohibit them from engaging
in outside political activities. Nelson has set the groundwork for this
type of extension of the First Amendment's free press clause. As a
result, Nelson's impact may turn out to be the political silencing of
one of the most important segments of our population, broadcast
journalists, merely by virtue of the profession they chose.
VI. ALLOWING POLITICAL PROMISCUITY IN BROADCAST
JOURNALISM: ALTERNATIVES TO POLITICAL ABSTINENCE
Politically neutralizing broadcast journalists is not only uncon-
stitutional, but is counterproductive to the goals of achieving objec-
tivity in the press. Journalism, however, should not be completely
biased either.22 4 Indeed, there are some viable alternatives to politi-
cal abstinence for achieving objectivity in the press.
The first alternative is to lift all restrictions on the outside ac-
tivities of journalists. Thereafter, journalists would feel more in-
clined to reveal their relevant biases to their supervisors without fear
of a backlash resulting in demotion or termination. This openness
will reveal the affiliations, beliefs, and biases of broadcast journal-
ists. Furthermore, news stations concerned with neutrality would be
223. Id. Among other "famous faces" that have made it on the network news
circuit are former presidential hopeful Pat Buchanan, who is a co-host on
CNN's Crossfire; former Bill Clinton senior advisor George Stephanopoulos,
who is an analyst for ABC's Good Morning America and This Week;, former
aide to Democratic Senator Patrick Moynihan, Tim Russert, who hosts NBC's
Meet The Press; and former Richard Nixon aide Diane Sawyer, who hosts
ABC's 20/20. See id.
224. In order to uphold the circulation of ideas, the press must have some
objective characteristics. See Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S.
241,258 (1974).
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alerted to the possibility of meaningful conflicts of interest. After
all, an open policy poses a lower risk to objectivity than prohibitive
policies, which can lead to the subtle infiltration of bias into news
reports. As a result, broadcast journalists may also take the initiative
to approach supervisors about certain assignments out of concern
that they will not be able to report fairly on a particular topic. 225 This
approach is more effective because the news media generally attract
people who keep their values separate from their work.2 6 Finally,
news stations can simply reassign journalists to different stories, in-
stead of demoting or terminating them, when they have strong politi-
cal or personal feelings.
As a second alternative, employers could support subjective
newsgathering and reporting by allowing broadcast journalists to in-
fuse strong personal convictions into stories, buttressed by facts and
empirical evidence. This type of reporting reflects the era of muck-
raking joumalism 22 7 and, like muckraking, can effect important po-
litical and social changes.
Regardless of the alternative a news station chooses to adopt, it
should abandon the illusory principle of absolute neutrality. The
news station should also consider the experiences and affiliations
that shape each journalist's reporting style and candidly acknowledge
these biases, thereby connecting meaningfully with its audience.
Courts should develop a test that balances the journalist's interest in
free expression against the protected interest of the news station,
thereby intervening to protect the journalist's speech without violat-
ing the news station's rights.
225. See David Shaw, Can Women Reporters Write Objectively on Abortion
Issue?, L.A. TIMES, July 3, 1990, at A23 (reporting the experience of one Los
Angeles Times reporter, Patt Morrison, who agreed to receive no assignments
related to abortion after she expressed her concerns over her beliefs to her edi-
tors).
226. See GANS, supra note 18, at 184.
227. See J. HERBERT ALTSCHULL, FROM MILTON TO MCLUHAN: THE IDEAS
BEHIND AMERICAN JOURNALISM 271-76 (1990). "A muckraking work ex-
poses a hidden situation, depicts the situation prescriptively, locates an agent of
control, indicates preferred action, incites audience response and maintains
authorial autonomy." Harry H. Stein, American Muckraking of Technology
Since 1900, 67 JOURNALISM Q. 401, 401-02 (1990).
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VII. CONCLUSION
Democratic societies demand freedom of expression because it
is essential to participation in decision making by all members of so-
ciety, to individual self-fulfillment, to the advancement of knowl-
edge, to the discovery of truth, and to the maintenance of a proper
balance between stability and change.228 Suppressing individual po-
litical freedoms in exchange for a free press is wrong. After all, the
press does not become any less "free" if journalists are permitted to
express political views in their private lives. Abstaining from out-
side political activity is not an integral part of producing unbiased
news reporting or preventing the appearance of bias. The mere fact
that the press prohibits journalists from engaging in outside political
activity does not guarantee the objectivity of its news. Rather, it may
even work to the news station's disadvantage because such practices
will leave journalists with only one avenue of expression: journal-
ism. Accordingly, journalists will have no alternative but to express
their political views through their journalistic work. Thus, if the true
aim is objectivity, the misconception that journalists can somehow be
neutralized through internal policies has a reverse and counterpro-
ductive effect.
Concern about employers improperly restricting employee po-
litical activity is legitimate, as illustrated by the enactment of statutes
like the Washington Fair Campaign Practices and other state laws
protecting employees' political activities. Striking down laws that
protect journalists on free press grounds does nothing to allay these
concerns. Furthermore, granting the press the power to control its
credibility by attempting to maintain the objectivity of its journalists
makes way for corporate abuse of the First Amendment's free speech
provision. The press can use this power to increase profits through
the appearance of objectivity and, at the same time, suppress em-
ployee political speech that is unfavorable to its corporate ideals.
The First Amendment, however, was not drafted to protect the finan-
cial interests of the press, but rather to allow unhindered expression.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court should review the issue of
whether the appearance of objectivity is a valid corporate objective
228. See THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 3-15 (1966).
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for the press in exercising its First Amendment right to a free press.
The Court should also scrutinize the legitimacy of granting a blanket
protection under the free press clause. Further, the Court must clar-
ify the ruling in Tornillo so that state high courts, like the Washing-
ton Supreme Court, will not extend it to prohibit government regula-
tion of the press's employment decisions. No entity, including the
press, should have a green light to discriminate against employees
based on their intimate right to engage in political expression.
"[T]he unlimited freedom to express political views is the very heart
of a democratic body, pumping the lifeblood of ideas without which
our system could not survive. 2 29
Tom K. Ara*
229. Mitchell v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 196 Cal. App. 2d 796,
804, 16 Cal. Rptr. 813, 818 (1961).
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